We view the syntax-based approaches to de fault reasoning as a model-based diagnosis pr oblem, where each source giving a piece of information is considered as a component. It is formalized in the ATMS framework (each source corresponds to an assumption). We assume then that all sources are indepen dent and "fail" with a very small probability. This leads to a probability assignment on the set of candidates, or equivalently on the set of consistent environments. This probability assignment induces a Dempster-Shafer belief function which measures the probability that a proposition can be deduced from the evi dence. This belief function can be used in several different ways to define a nonmono tonic consequence relation. We study ans compare these consequence relations. The case of prioritized knowledge bases is briefly considered.
1

Introduction
Syntax-based approaches to inconsistency handling, default reasoning and belief revision have been pro posed and studied in various forms (e.g. [14] , [16] , [31] , [15] , [4] , [6] , [24] , and especially [25] and [1] ). They assume that the input (the knowledge base -KB for short) consists of a set of logical sentences, possibly equipped with a priority ordering; when this knowledge base is inconsistent, these approaches select among the consistent sub-bases of the KB some pre ferred sub-bases (the selection criterion can be for in stance maximality w.r.t. set inclusion1 or cardinality). A consequence relation is then generally defined by taking the intersection of the logical closures of these preferred sub-bases. Each formula of the KB is con sidered as a distinct piece of information, which can 1 In this case the preferred sub-bases coincide with the extensions of default logic [36] restricted to normal defaults without prerequisites.
be kept in the knowledge base or rejected from it in dependently from the others; therefore, it may happen that two semantically equivalent knowledge bases may be revised differently and thus lead to different conclu sions -this is why they are called syntax-based. Con sider for instance K 1 = {p, •p, q} and K 2 = {pl\q, •p}; q holds in all maximal consistent sub-bases of Kt but this is not the case for K2. When cardinality is used to select preferred subbases, even the number of oc currences of identical (or logically equivalent) formu las in K matters: for instance, {p, -,p} has two consis tent sub-bases of maximum cardinality ( {p} and { -,p})
where as {p, •p, -,p} has only one ( { -,p, •p}). Now, in model-based diagnosis, the consistency-based approaches (see [37] , [13] , [35] ) proceed in a very sim ilar manner, since they look for preferred candidates, i.e. minimal (w.r.t. a given selection criterion) sets of faulty components, such that the description of how the non-faulty components work is consistent with the observations2. The link between default reasoning and model-based diagnosis has already been well studied (e.g. [33] , [37] , [26] , [20] ): indeed, the principles be hind consistency-based diagnosis and syntax-based ap proaches are basically the same: there is a correspon dance between a source providing us with a piece of information and a component of a diagnosis problem; a faulty component corresponds to an erratic source which gives a piece of information which is not rele vant (by analogy, we will say that the source is faulty). When the component is working correctly, the formula describing its normal behaviour must be satisfied, and analogously, when the source is not faulty, the formula associated to it must be true in the real world. Then, a candidate in a diagnosis problem (i.e. a set of compo nents consistent with the observations) corresponds to a candidate in a syntax-based default reasoning prob lem (i.e. a set of formulas whose deletion restores the consistency of the knowledge base).
In the well-known diagnosis system GDE, De Kleer and Williams [11] propose a probabilistic criterion to 2The principle of minimizing the set of faulty compo nents w.r.t. a given criterion is generally called principle of parsimony (see e.g. [29] ). rank candidates: each component has an initial prob ability of fault, and it is assumed that components fail independently; then, the a posteriori probability that a given candidate is the real candidate is computed via Bayes' rule, conditioning by the observations. This principle of ranking candidates w .r. t. their probability assumes the initial probabilities of fault are available. When it is not the case, De Kleer [12] proposes to as sume that all components have a very small probability of fault. What we propose to do here is to use a similar assumption for syntax-based default reasoning, which induces probabilities of the consistent sub-bases of the KB (which comes down to compute the probabilities of the candidates -a candidate specifies which pieces of information have to be rejected and thus which ones remain in the KB). We will check that, as expected, the consistent sub-bases of maximal cardinality are the most probable ones. This probability distribution in duces then a Dempster-Shafer belief function, which evaluates the probability that a formula can be proved from the available evidence (which consists only in the KB and the assumptions of independence and small probabilities of fault). The most original contribution of this paper is to propose (and to compare) many different ways to define a syntax-based consequence relation from this induced belief function. An inter esting point is that we will then recover some already known syntax-based consequence relations (but with a new justification) and obtain a few new ones. Lastly, we propose briefly a generalization to the case of pri oritized knowledge bases.
2
Inconsistent knowledge bases as systems to diagnose
From now on, £ denotes a propositional language gen erated by a fi nite number of propositional variables. Formulas will be denoted by greek letters rp, ¢, etc. T denotes tautology, F= classical entailment and Cn logical closure.
A knowledge base (KB) intuitively consists of a set :F of hard facts which cannot be rejected, and a multiset � of default formulas which can be rejected if necessary3. To distinguish each default from the others, we create a set of assumptions A = {A1, ... ,An} (with as many assumptions as defaults) and label each default with a distinct assumption. We define a knowledge base as in [31] and we then recall well-known definitions of the ATMS and model-based diagnosis literatures [10] , [37] , [11] , [13] .
Definition 1 A knowledge base K is defined as a couple K = (:F, Ll) where 3We recall that in a multiset several occurrences of the same element are distinguished: this obviously has to be the case for syntax-based approaches where several occur rences of the same default constitute several distinct pieces of information.
• :F is a finite set of formulas (hard facts)
• Ll = {'Pl. .. . , 'Pn} a finite multiset of formulas (de faults). Pursuing the analogy with model-based diagnosis, the source of information corresponding to the assumption A; can be viewed as a component; rp; is then the log ical description of how the component works. If A; is true then the source is "non-faulty" and the associated formula 'Pi is satisfied in the real world; if A; is false then the source is "faulty" and then we don't know whether the associated formula is satisfied or not in the real world {in terms of diagnosis, it corresponds to the assumption that we don't know how behaves a faulty component).
As in [13] a nogood {Ait> ... , Ai,} will also be written logically by -.A; 1 V ... V ..,A; P 8 ; a candidate {Ah, ... , AJ.} will also be written logically by -,A il (' ... I\ -.AJ.· The nogood base, denoted by -.N, ts the conjunction of all irredundant nogoods; it is well known to be equivalent to the conjunction of all mini mal nogoods, and as well to the disjunction of all [irre dundant] candidates [13] . A detailed example is given in Section 3 and continued in Section 4.
4Instead of this we could have equivalently generated the set of ATMS justifications A; ---+ <p;
6This is called an interpretation in [10] 7 Obviously, a minimal (resp. mincard) candidate is the complementary of an irredundant (resp. maxcard) consis tent environment.
8Note that -.A; , corresponds to De Kleer et al.'s [13] notation AB( c;i) meaning that the component c;1 is faulty. From syntactical knowledge bases to belief functions
Computing the probability of environments
As in [12} we make the two following basic assump tions:
• (I) each assumption is independent from the oth ers. This means t hat each default piece of infor mation is kept or rejected independently from the others -which is in accordance with the spirit of syntax-based approaches to default reasoning.
• (S) all assumptions are assigned the same initial probability (the sources have the same prior prob ability of fault), and this probability of fault is very small: Vi, Prob(-.A;) = t:, with£« 1.
This leads to define a probability assignment on the en vironment set 2A. Thus, the prior probability of an en vironment E of cardinality k is Pr(E) = t:Tl-k(l-c)k (which is approximated by c:Tl-k when c:
is the prior probability that E is the real environment,
i.e. the environment corresponding to the real world. Now, this real environment must be consistent; to en sure that inconsistent environments are given a zero probability, the prior probability is conditioned on the consistent environments (see e.g. [22) ), i.e.
Proposition 1 Assume that there are exactly p max card consistent environments; let k be their cardinality. Let E be any consistent environment. Then9
let us prove first prove that Pr( -.N) pe n-k + O(t:Tl-k+ 1 ). Let C1, ... ,Cp be the mincard candidates; they are the complementary of the max card consistent environments, so their cardinality is n-k. Let Cp+l, ... , Cq be the other irredundant can didates. Pr(-.N) = Pr(C1 v ... v Cq) == Pr(Ct) + ... + Pr(Cp) +Pr(Cp+t) + .. . + Pr(Cq)-Li#i Pr(C; 1\ Ci )+ "E.,;'Ii,UI,ifl Pr(C;I\Ci 1\Cf)+ .... Now, Pr(C1) = ... = Pr(Cp) = cn-k; Vi= p + l...q, Pr(C;) = t:Tl-k+l; and Vi, j such that i :j:. j, C; 1\ C; contains at most n -k + 1 literals ..,A;'s (if it contained only n -k, since n -k is the maximum cardinality of a con sistent environment, one of the two candidates C; and Cj would be contained in the other one, which would contradict the fact they are irredundant); thus, Pr( C; 1\ C;) � e-" -k+l. A fortiori, for all conjunctions 9We recall that the notation O(gk) denotes any function
of more than two C;'s: Pr(C;1
Computing the probability of the consistent environ ments is exactly the same task as computing the proba bilities of candidates in consistency-based model-based diagnosis ( [11] , [12] , [35] ). Proposition 1 tells that the only consistent environments whose probability does not tend to 0 when t: -+ 0 are those of maximal car dinality. This is in accordance with a version of the principle of parsimony consisting in considering only the candidates of minimum cardinality ([12} , [29] ).
It is also interesting to compute the probability of fault of a single source, namely Pr( -.Ad-.N):
Proposition 2 As before, assume that there are e:r actly p maxcard consistent environments and let k be their cardinality. Let A; be an assumption.
• if A; is absent of r � 1 maxcard consistent envi ronments, then
• if A; appears in all maxcard consistent environ ments, and is absent of r' irredundant consistent environments of cardinality k-1, then
The proof uses the same kind of considerations as the proof of Proposition 1. 
Here are the irredundant consistent environments, their probability and their context10: The maxcard consistent environments are {At,A 2 ,A4}, {At,A3,A4} and {A2,A3,A4}.
3.2
How probabilities of candidates induce a belief function
We have seen that the knowledge base K induces a probability assignment of the environment see 2.A. This probability assignment of the assumption set in duces a Dempster-Sha.fer belieffunction (see f22}, [34] , [27] , [9] , [38] for a study of this connection between ATMS and belief functions). As studied in detail by Smets [38] , this belief function represents a probability of deductibility, i.e. the probability that the evidence is sufficient to prove the proposition (see also [22] , (27] ). This belief function is given by 11
Pr(EI·N)
EE2"\"P/IE Context(E)
Proof if :F I= 1j; for any environment E, ¢ E Context(E) and therefore Belx(¢) = 1. Reciprocally, if Belx(¢) = 1 then consider the environment 0; it has a non-zero probability and its context is only :F, therefore :F F= t/J. Proposition 4 Let k..p be the maximum cardinality of a consistent environment E such that t/J E Context(E) (if any) and let U!fi be the number of such environ ments; as before, let k be the cardinality of a maxcard consistent environment. Then
11 An equivalent expression of Belg(I/J) is (see for in stance [22] )
where label( 1/J) is the logical expression of the set of all ir redundant consistent environments in which 1/J is provable.
• if there is no consistent environment E such that 1j; E Conte:ct(E) then
The proof comes immediately from Proposition 1.
Example (continued):
Inducing consequence relations
We have seen that, given a knowledge base K, and assuming small fault probabilities and independence of the sources, we obtain a belief function Belx on £ induced by K; Be/K ( ¢) is the probability that ¢ be deductible from K from the evidence. Now, we can use this generated belief function to define nonmonotonic consequence relations (CR) on £. We are going to investigate several proposals of CRs, many of which will appear to be well-known. We define the CRs in the syntax as Pink as and Loui [30] , namely K f'--¢ means that the formula¢ is inferred from the knowledge base K 12.
As in [31] we define a scenario of K = (:F, �) as a consistent subset S of :F U� containing :F (note that Cn(S) is the context of a consistent environment). A scenario is said irredundant (resp. maxcard) iff it is maximal w.r.t. set inclusion (resp. cardinality).
Proposition 5 K f'--t 1j; iff for any maxcard scenario S of K, S f= t/J.
The proof comes easily from the fact that only max card consistent environments have a probability which does not tend to 0. This kind of CR is known as a strong CR. More precisely, f---1 has been studied in a more general setting (and with priorities) in (23] and [1] 13. This result gives thus a new interpretation of this well-known inference relation.
12Note that, in spite of the syntax K f"--1/J, f"--is actu ally a unary CRs; a binary CR induced by K would be f"--K where rp f"--K 1/J means that with respect to the background knowledge represented by K, if we assume rp then we infer nonmonotonically 1/J (and the unary case is recovered when rp = T). For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we define only the unary restrictions of the CRs; however this restric tion is not essential: indeed, syntax-based CRs generally satisfy tp f"--K 1/J iff f---Add(K,\0') 1/J, where Add(K,rp) = (.F U{<p}, t:.) ( see [1] ). Again, the proof comes from the fact that the consis tent environments with a non infinitely small belief are the maxcard ones. This CR is the weak (existential) counterpart of f---1. The proof comes from the fact that all consistent en vironments have a non-zero probability. This well known weak CR corresponds to the provability in at least one extension of a normal default theory without prerequisites 1 4. This result is a corollary of Proposition 8. This CR is another argumentative CR.
Proposition 10 K f---6 -rjJ iff '1/J is provable in the ma jority (more than one half) of the maxcard scenarios of K.
The proof comes directly from the fact that all max card consistent environments have all the same proba bility (namely l) and that the non-maxcard ones have p an infinitely small probability. This kind of CR has been called majority CR in [30] .
The corresponding strong CR (provability in all exten sions) , which is more interesting and which has received many improvements in the literature, seems to have no nice characterization in our framework.
A sufficient condition for K f---6 ¢ to hold is when the number of max card scenarios entailing 1/; is greater than the number of maxcard scenarios entailing -,'1/J.
However this condition is not necessary; the exact characterization is more complex:
Proposition 11 Let u(k, '1/J) be the number of sce narios of K of cardinality k entailing ¢.
Let
Here It is dear from this proof that this CR has a lexi cographic spirit: indeed, Proposition 11 could have stated equivalently by :
where >lex is the lexicographic or dering.
.p, where k.p is been defined like in Proposition 4, with the convention kl/i = -oo iff¢ appears in the context of no consistent environment.
The proof comes easily from Proposition 4.
Definition 11 K r-9 w iff BelK('l/J) = 1.
This is a clone of Proposition 3 and has thus already been proved. This CR is very strong and it is even monotonic since it accepts only the consequences of hard facts. 
Extension to the prioritized case
Many syntax-based approaches to default reasoning assume that the knowledge base is partitioned into priority levels, namely K = (Kt, ... , Kn) (1 being by convention the most prioritary level); these levels are qualitative and generally it is more acceptable to vi olate any number of formulas of a lower priority level then violate one formula of a higher priority level.
A generalization of the maximum cardinality princi ple to the prioritized case is defined both in [1] and in [23] : a sub-base A of a prioritized knowledge base (K1, ... , Kn) is lexicographically strictly preferred to a sub-base B iff there exists a i E l..n such that '</j > i, lA n Sj I = IB n Sj I and lA n Sd > IB n si I; the same selection criterium has been used in diagnosis by DeKleer [1 '2] . Now, it is possible to character ize lexicographically preferred subtheories in terms of probabilities of fault; following De Kleer [12] , for any piece of information in Ki we assign an initial proba bility of fault of t:; to its source, with the constraint that '</i and '</j > i, €J � €i (more precisely, that €j < c{ma:r, where fmax is an upper bound of the maximum number of formulas of a priority level -we may take for instance fmax = IKJ). Then it can be shown that the only consistent environments of K hav ing an a posteriori probability which does not tend to 0 when € --+ 0 correspond exactly to the lexicograph ically preferred subbases (which generalizes Proposi tion 1 ), and that 1/J is lexicographically deduced from K iff Belx('I/J) -t-o 1 (which generalizes Proposition 5).
6 Related work and conclusion
We have strengthened the already known connections between syntax-based default reasoning, model-based diagnosis and ATMS, and belief functions, by building on deKleer's infinitesimal probabilities of fault. We have followed the following steps:
(1) syntax-based nonmonotonic entailment is viewed as diagnosis, by considering each piece of information as the description of how a component works, and the source which provided us with it as the component;
(2) we assume that all sources have very small {and equal) initial probabilities of fault, and that they are [18) ); in these approaches the default rule a _. f3 is translated by Pr(f31a) � 1 -e:
with £ � 1. The main difference with our use of in finitesimal probabilities relies in their interpretation (in the latter approaches they are conditional probabil ities qualifying default rules while in ours they qualify the relevance of a piece of information).
Obviously, steps (3) and (4) can be done without as suming infinitely small prior probabilities. Thus, the definitions given in Section 4 still make sense in the case we start with non-infinitesimal user-given proba bilities of failure; but the results do not hold any longer and the characterization of these inference relations is thus much less interesting.
We would like to emphasize that our contribution does not really propose a new formalism nor a new way to perform nonmonotonic reasoning, but rather puts together the (already known) links between syntax based default reasoning on one side, and ATMS, di agnosis and belief functions on the other side, and as sumes further independence of the pieces of informa tion and infinitely small probabilities of failure. Now, although the theoretical complexity of syntax-based entailment relations has received recently some atten tion [25) [7] , up to now, the more practical algorithmic and implementation issues have been less studied in the literature of syntax-based default reasoning than in the literature of ATMS and model-based diagnosis.
Therefore, our conclusion (and our hope) is that that syntax-based default reasoning should benefit from ex isting works on the aforementioned fields, such as the characterization of tractable subclasses (e.g. [5] ), ex perimental results etc.
